Council consultant investigates remote control of Valdez terminal

In mid-2012, the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council launched an investigation into the risk of spills associated with remote control of the Valdez Marine Terminal, or VMT.

The final report is now in from consultant Dan Hisey, who formerly was chief operating officer for Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., the Anchorage-based energy company consortium that runs the 800-mile trans-Alaska oil pipeline and the VMT. Hisey left the company in 2005.

The report lists 11 main findings and recommendations. None appear to be blockbusters.

More interesting, perhaps, is Hisey’s discussion of the difficulty he says he had in getting Alyeska to cooperate with his investigation.

While Alyeska provided certain documents pertaining to remote control of the VMT, and made supervisory employees available for interviews, Alyeska denied access to other documents and workers necessary to verify whether the company actually complies with its own policies and procedures, Hisey and the council say.

Thus, Hisey was forced to use whatever publicly available information he could find to finish his report, the council says.

Anchorage control center

Alyeska runs the pipeline and terminal from its Operations Control Center, or OCC, in Anchorage. A backup control center is located at Palmer.

The OCC has separate controller consoles for the pipeline and the terminal, Hisey’s report says.

“The OCC continually monitors the status of all pump stations, mainline valves and key VMT assets using ... systems with remote sensors,” the report says. “Data such as pressures, flow rates, temperatures, tank levels and valve positions are recorded and analyzed for abnormal operations or any indication of a pipeline leak.”

The report adds: “Some, but not all major assets at the VMT are controlled by the VMT controller stationed in the OCC.”

The pipeline and Valdez oil terminal have operated since 1977. Originally, the OCC was located in Valdez, but was moved to Anchorage in 2007.

Report findings

•Some of Alyeska’s control system standards don’t contain enough detail for workers.

“In other words, the documents generally describe ‘what’ needs to be done, but in many cases not ‘how’ to do it,” the report says.

•Causes identified in an “unrecognized” event in 2010 where a crude oil holding tank overflowed at Pump Station 9, south of Fairbanks, are “relevant” to control of the VMT.

•The council should request a status update from Alyeska on a project work request, written in 2008, to replace a VMT structure housing critical control system hardware, as well as the main fire control panel.

•It’s unclear how Alyeska manages control system alarms.

Hisey’s report contains a few other interesting tidbits. For example, it reveals that Alyeska allows the use of seasonal affective disorder, or SAD, lights in the control room. That’s certainly something many people can relate to during Alaska’s long, dark winters.

Alyeska’s position

He listed many manuals, logs and other documents provided to Hisey, and said the OCC and VMT directors were made available for interviews.

Barrett also pointed out that OCC control of VMT functions is limited. For example, people in Valdez control the loading of tankers from a console on the berth. He said tanker loading automatically shuts down if the Anchorage control center loses “visibility” of the loading.

Barrett further said the U.S. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, an agency he once headed, had recently completed a full assessment of control room management procedures, including alarm management, and was satisfied with company practices and issued “no adverse findings.”

PHMSA didn’t issue a report on the Alyeska control room inspection. But Hisey says inspection documents obtained from the agency noted some “concerns.”

—Wesley Loy